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Abstract
Contrary to its initial idea, Belnap’s (1992) theory of Branching
Space-Times (BST) has models in which histories do not resemble re-
lativistic space-times or any other physical space-times. The aim of
this paper is to define a certain class of BST models, called ”Minkows-
kian Branching Structures” (MBS), in which histories are isomorphic
to Minkowski space-time. By focusing on these models rather than
on general BST models, we hope that one may be able to improve on
earlier BST analyzes of physical phenomena. Also, introducing MBS’
sets the stage for recent discussions about whether or not ‘branching
is a bad idea’, physically speaking.
1 Introduction
Branching Space-Times (BST) of Belnap (1992) is a possible-worlds theory
that intends to combine, in a rigorous fashion, indeterminism, relativity and
modalities. Yet, ironically, BST allows for histories that resemble neither
relativistic space-times nor any other physical space-times. Mu¨ller, Belnap
and Kishida (2006) discovered a structure called M2 which, while being a
BST model, is in no way similar to the intended pictures of the theory. Our
aim in this paper is thus to define a certain class of BST models called ”Min-
kowskian Branching Structures” (MBS), in which histories are isomorphic to
∗We read earlier versions of this paper at the seminar ‘Chaos and Quantum Infor-
mation’ held at the Jagiellonian University in Krako´w on April 16, 2007 and at the se-
minar ‘On Determinism’ held at the University of Bonn on April 20, 2007. For com-
ments and valuable discussions we are grateful to the audiences, and in particular, to Dr.
Thomas Mu¨ller. Authors’ address: Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University,
Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krako´w, Poland; LW’s email: elwro1@gmail.com and TP’s email:
uzplacek@cyf-kr.edu.pl.
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Minkowski space-time. In defining the notion we follow the lead of Mu¨ller
(2002), yet with two crucial diversions. First, we remove Mu¨ller’s finiteness
assumptions, as they prohibit the introduction of ‘interesting’ infinite struc-
tures. Second, we improve on Mu¨ller’s failed proof of the most desired feature
of MBS, namely that every history is isomorphic to Minkowski space-time.
To this end we assume a certain topological postulate.
By concentrating on MBS’ rather than general BST models, one may
avoid a certain awkwardness inherent in earlier analyses of some physical
phenomena, done from a BST perspective.1 In essence, they tried to fit
information about the location of objects into models with no metric features.
This problem will not arise in our structures.
Singling out the class of MBS models has yet another advantage: It has
been alleged in the philosophy of physics community that branching is a bad
idea.2 Yet, to sensibly discuss the pros and cons of branching, as applied to
physics, one had better have a class of BST models which have some pretense
at being ‘physically realistic’.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some definitions
and theorems of BST which we will need later. Section 3 defines and discusses
Minkowskian Branching Structures. The final section 4 states our conclusions
and an open problem.
2 Branching Space-Times
The theory of Branching Space-Times (BST) of Belnap (1992), combines
objective indeterminism and relativity in a rigorous way. Its primitives are a
nonempty set W (called “Our World”, interpreted as the set of all possible
point events) and a partial ordering 6 on W , interpreted as a “causal order”
between point events.
There are no “Possible Worlds” in this theory; there is only one world,
Our World, containing all that is (timelessly) possible. Instead, a notion of
“history” is used, as defined below:
1To give some examples, the Bell / Aspect Theorems were analyzed in
Belnap and Szabo´ (1996), Kowalski and Placek (1999), and Mu¨ller and Placek (2001). A
branching perspective on quantum holism was put forward in Placek (2004). A BST rea-
ding of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics was given in Mu¨ller
(2007). Some questions from the philosophy of time were discussed, from a BST perspec-
tive, in Mu¨ller (2006).
2See for instance J. Earman’s talk at the Ontology of Space-Time conference, Montreal
2006.
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Definition 1 A set h ⊆ W is upward-directed iff ∀e1, e2 ∈ h ∃e ∈ h such
that e1 6 e and e2 6 e.
A set h is maximal with respect to the above property iff ∀g ∈ W such
that g ! h, g is not upward-directed.
A subset h of W is a history iff it is a maximal upward-directed set.
For histories h1 and h2, any maximal element in h1∩h2 is called a choice
point for h1 and h2.
A very important feature of BST is that histories are closed downward:
if e1 6 e2 and e1 /∈ h, then e2 /∈ h. In other words, there is no backward
branching among histories in BST. No two incompatible events are in the
past of any event; equivalently: the past of any event is “fixed”, containing
only compatible events.
We will now give the definition of a BST model; for more information
about BST in general see Belnap (1992).
Definition 2 〈W,6〉 where W is a nonempty set and 6 is a partial ordering
on W is a model of BST if and only if it meets the following requirements:
1. The ordering 6 is dense.
2. 6 has no maximal elements.
3. Every lower bounded chain in W has an infimum in W .
4. Every upper bounded chain in W has a supremum in every history that
contains it.
5. (Prior choice principle (’PCP’)) For any lower bounded chain O ∈
h1 − h2 there exists a point e ∈ W such that e is maximal in h1 ∩ h2
and ∀e
′
∈ O e < e
′
.
Note that BST has the causal ordering 6, yet in general it has neither
space-time points nor a space-time (i.e., a collection of space-time points).
The intuition behind space-time points is that we want to be able to say
that something happens “in the same space-time point” in different histories.
A triple 〈W,6, s〉 is a “BST model with space-time points” (BST+S) iff
〈W,6〉 is a BST model and s (from the expression “space-time point”) is
an equivalence relation on W such that 1) for each history h in W and for
each equivalence class s(x), x ∈ W , the intersection h∩s(x) contains exactly
one element and 2) s respects the ordering: for equivalence classes s(x), s(y)
and histories h1, h2, s(x) ∩ h1 = s(y) ∩ h1 iff s(x) ∩ h2 = s(y) ∩ h2, and
the same for “<” and “>”. As Mu¨ller (2005) shows, not every BST model
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can be extended to a BST+S model. Moreover, there are BST+S models,
whose space-time S has nothing in common with any physically motivated
space-time – the structure M2 of Mu¨ller, Belnap and Kishida (2006) is an
example.
3 IntroducingMinkowskian Branching Struc-
tures
We are now going to single out a class of BST models in which histories occur
in Minkowski space-time. This part of our work is based on Mu¨ller’s (2002)
theory.
The points of Minkowski space-time are elements ofR4, e.g. x=〈x0, x1, x2, x3〉,
where the first element of the quadruple is the time coordinate. The Min-
kowski space-time distance is a function D2M : R
4×R4 → R defined as follows
(for x, y ∈ R4):
D2M(x, y) := −(x
0 − y0)2 +
3∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 (1)
The natural ordering on the Minkowski space-time, call it “Minkowskian
ordering 6M”, is defined as follows (x, y ∈ R
4):
x 6M y iff D
2
M(x, y) 6 0 and x
0
6 y0 (2)
We will say that two points x, y ∈ R4 are space-like related (“SLR” for
short) iff neither x 6M y nor y 6M x. Naturally, x <M y iff x 6= y and
x 6M y.
Now we need to provide a framework for “different ways in which things
can happen” and for filling the space-times with content. For the first task
we will need a set Σ of labels σ, η, .... (In contrast to Mu¨ller (2002), we allow
for any cardinality of Σ). For the second task, we will use a so-called “state”
function S : Σ × R4 → P , where P is a set of point properties (on this we
just quote Mu¨ller saying “finding out what the right P is is a question of
physics, not one of conceptual analysis”).
One could ask about the reasons for an extra notion of a “scenario”. Why
don’t we build histories just out of points from R4 × P ? The reason is that
a member of BST’s Our World has a fixed past. If two different trains of
events lead to exactly the same event E ∈ R4 × P , the situation gives rise
to two different point events, two different members of W . In contrast: for
a point 〈x, p0〉 from R
4 × P there can exist two different points 〈y, p1〉 and
4
〈y, p2〉 from R
4 × P such that y <M x. This would be a case of backward
branching, so the set R4 × P is not a good candidate for the master set W
of any BST model.
The idea behind the concept of scenario is that every scenario corres-
ponds to an R4 space filled with content3, where the content derives from
the elements of P . Assuming that a certain state function S is given, for any
σ, η ∈ Σ the set Cση ⊂ R
4 is the set of “splitting points” between scenarios
σ and η; intuitively it is the set of points in which a choice between the two
scenarios is made. All members of Cση have to be space-like related. Of
course a choice between σ and η is a choice between η and σ, so Cση = Cησ.
The BST axiom of prior choice principle motivates our postulate that any
two different scenarios split. Formally: ∀σ, η ∈ Σ (σ 6= η ⇒ Cση 6= ∅).
The next requirement concerns triples of scenarios. Any set Cση deter-
mines a region in which both scenarios coincide: namely, that part of R4 that
is not in the Minkowskian sense strictly above any point from Cση. Following
Mu¨ller we call it the region of overlap Rση between scenarios σ, η defined as
below:
Rση := {x ∈ R
4|¬∃y ∈ Cση y <M x} (3)
(Of course it follows that for any σ, η ∈ ΣCση ⊆ Rση.) Assuming the sets Cση
and Cηγ are given, we get two regions of overlaps Rση and Rηγ . At the points
in the intersection of those two regions σ coincides with η and η coincides
with γ, therefore by transitivity σ coincides with γ. In general we can say
that for any σ, η, γ ∈ R4
Rσγ ⊇ Rση ∩ Rηγ (4)
which, translated to a requirement on sets of splitting points, is
∀x ∈ Cσγ∃y ∈ Cση ∪ Cηγy 6M x. (5)
In his paper Mu¨ller put another requirement on Cση: finitude. The mo-
tivation was to exclude splitting along a “simultaneity slice”. The strong
requirement of finitude, however, excludes many more types of situations in
which splitting is not continuous or happens in a region of space-time of finite
diameter. In the present paper we drop this requirement, not putting any
restrictions on the cardinality of Cση for any σ, η ∈ Σ. As a side-note, this
leads to the fact that in some models there may be choice points which are
not intuitively connected with any splitting point. For details, see 5 in the
Appendix.
3Fix a scenario α. The above mentioned corresponding space filled with content is
A ⊆ R4 × P such that 〈x, p〉 ∈ A iff S(α, x) = p.
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The state function assigns to each pair 〈a label from Σ, a point from R4〉
an element of P . Colloquially, the state function tells us what happens at a
certain point of the space-time in a given scenario.4
After Mu¨ller (2002), we now proceed to construct the elements of the
MBS version of Our World; they will be equivalence classes of a certain
relation 6S on Σ×R
4. For convenience, we write the elements of Σ×R4 as
xσ, where x ∈ R
4, σ ∈ Σ. The idea is to “glue together” points in regions of
overlap; hence the relation is defined as below:
xσ ≡S yη iff x = y and x ∈ Rση. (6)
Mu¨ller provides a simple proof of the fact that ≡S is an equivalence relation
on Σ×R4; therefore, we can produce a quotient structure. The result is the
set B, which is the MBS version of Our World:
B := (Σ× R4)/ ≡S = {[xσ]|σ ∈ Σ, x ∈ R
4}, (7)
where [xσ] is the equivalence class of x with respect to the relation ≡S:
[xσ] = {xη|xσ ≡S xη}. (8)
Next, we define a relation 6S on B:
[xσ] 6S [yη] iff x 6M y and xσ ≡S xη, (9)
which (as Mu¨ller shows) is a partial ordering on B.
The goal would now be to prove that 〈B,6S〉 is a model of BST. To do
so, and in particular to prove the prior choice principle and requirement no.
4 from definition 2, we need to know more about the shape of the histories
in MBS - that they are the intended ones.
3.1 The shape of MBS histories
We would like histories, that is, maximal upward-directed sets, to be sets of
equivalence classes [xσ] (with respect to ≡S) for x ∈ R
4 for some σ ∈ Σ. In
other words, we wish to unambiguously refer to any history by a label from
Σ, requiring one-to-one correspondence of the sets of histories and labels.
This is Mu¨ller’s (2002) Lemma 3 and our
Theorem 3 Every history in a given MBS is of the form h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R
4}
for some σ ∈ Σ.
4We can look at the situation from a slightly different perspective: every label σ is
assigned a mapping Sσ from R
4 to P ; see also the previous footnote.
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The problem is that, aside from minor brushing up required by the proof
of the “right” direction, the proof of the “left” direction supplied in Mu¨ller
(2002) needs to be fixed, as it does not provide adequate reasons for no-
nemptiness of an essential intersection
⋂
Σh(zi). More on that below. Let us
divide the above theorem into two lemmas (4 and 8), corresponding to the
directions and prove the “right” direction first. Until we prove the theorem
we refrain from using the term “history” and substitute it with a “maximal
upward-directed set” for clarity.
Lemma 4 If h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R
4} for some σ ∈ Σ, then h is a maximal
upward-directed subset of B.
Proof: Let us consider e1, e2 ∈ h, e1 = [xσ], e2 = [yσ]. Since x, y ∈ R
4,
there exists a z ∈ R4 such that x 6M z and y 6M z. Therefore, [xσ] 6S [zσ]
and [yσ] 6S [zσ], and so h is upward-directed.
For maximality, consider a g ⊆ B, g ! h and assume g is upward-directed.
It follows that there exists a point [xη] ∈ g − h such that [xη] 6= [xσ] ∈ h.
Since both points belong to g, which is upward-directed, there exists [zα] ∈ g
(note that we are not allowed to choose σ as the index at that point) such
that [xη] 6S [zα] and [xσ] 6S [zα]. Therefore, xη ≡S xα ≡S xσ, and so we
arrive at a contradiction by concluding that [xη] = [xσ]. Q.E.D.
The proof of the other direction is more complex and, what might be
surprising, involves a topological postulate. First, we will need a simple
definition:
Definition 5 For a given maximal upward-directed set h and a point x ∈ R4,
Σh(x) := {σ ∈ Σ|[xσ] ∈ h}.
Consider now a given maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B. With every
lower bounded chain L ⊂ R4 we would like to associate a topology (called
a “chain topology”) on the set of Σh(inf(L)). We define the topology by
describing the whole family of closed sets, which is equal to {∅,Σh(inf(L))}∪
{Σh(l)|l ∈ L}∪{∩{Σh(l)|l ∈ L}}. (Because L is a chain, it is evident that the
family is closed with respect to intersection and finite union). The postulate
runs as follows:
Postulate 6 For every maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and for every
lower bounded chain L ⊂ R4 the “chain topology” described above is compact.
It is easily verifiable that in such a topology {Σh(l)|l ∈ L} is a centred
family of closed sets (every finite subset of it has a nonempty intersection). It
is provable that the above postulate is equivalent to the following corollary:
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Corollary 7 For every maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and for every
chain L ⊂ R4,
⋂
{Σh(l)|l ∈ L} 6= ∅.
Lemma 8 If h is a maximal upward-directed subset of B, then h = {[xσ]|x ∈
R4} for some σ ∈ Σ.
The structure of the proof mimics Mu¨ller’s (2002) proof. It is divided
into three parts, the first and the last being reproduced here. On the other
hand, the second part contains an error (as stated above, the statement that⋂
Σh(zi) 6= ∅ is not properly justified) and relies on the assumption that for
every history h and point x ∈ R4 the set Σh(x) is at most countably infinite.
We wish both to drop this assumption and correct the proof using the above
topological postulate.
Proof: Suppose that h is a maximal upward-directed subset of B. In
order to prove the lemma, we will prove the following three steps:
1. If for some σ, η ∈ Σ both [xσ] ∈ h and [xη] ∈ h, then xσ ≡S xη.
2. There is a σ ∈ Σ such that for every η, if [xη] ∈ h, then xη ≡S xσ.
3. With the σ from step 2, h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R
4}.
Ad. 1. Since h is maximal by assumption, there exists a [yγ] ∈ h
such that [xσ] 6S [yγ] and [xη] 6S [yγ]. These last two facts imply that
xσ ≡S xγ ≡S xη, so by transitivity of ≡S we get xσ ≡S xη.
Ad. 2. Assume the contrary: ∀σ ∈ Σ ∃[xη] ∈ h, xη 6≡S xσ.
Take a point [yκ] ∈ h. Accordingly, Σh(y) 6= ∅.
For each scenario σα ∈ Σh(y) we define a set Θα = {x ∈ R
4 | ∃η ∈
Σh(y) : [xη] ∈ h ∧ xσα 6≡S xη}, which by our assumption is never empty.
Colloquially, it is a set of the points that make the scenario a wrong candidate
for the proper scenario from our lemma - the scenario “doesn’t fit” the history
at those points. For each scenario σα we would like to choose a single element
of Θα, and to that end we employ a choice function T defined on the set of
subsets of R4 such that T (Θα) ∈ Θα, naming the element chosen by it as
follows: T (Θα) := xα.
5
Observe that we will arrive at a contradiction if we prove that
⋂
σα∈Σh(y)
Σh(xα) 6= ∅ (10)
(since for any σβ ∈ Σh(y) σβ /∈ Σh(xβ)). In order to apply our topological
postulate, we will construct a chain L = {z0, z1, ... ,zω, ...} of points in R
4.
5Bear in mind that since α is a number serving just as an index for scenarios, xα (like
xβ in the line below inequality 10) is a point from R
4 and does not denote a point - scenario
pair.
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It will be lower bounded by its initial element z0. Moreover, we want it to be
vertical, since in this way it will (if it does not have an upper bound itself)
contain an upper bound of any point in R4, which will be needed in our proof.
We first define a function “up” which, given two points a, b ∈ R4, will
produce a point c ∈ R4 such that c has the same spatial coordinates as a but
is above b. In other words, if a = 〈a0, a1, a2, a3〉 ∈ R4, b = 〈b0, b1, b2, b3〉 ∈ R4,
up(a, b) := 〈a0 + (
3∑
1
(ai − bi)2)1/2, a1, a2, a3〉 ∈ R4. Notice that up is not
commutative.
We proceed to define the above mentioned chain L in the following way:
1.z0 = up(y, x0).
z1 = up(z0, x1).
Generally, zk+1 = up(zk, xk+1).
2. Suppose ρ is a limit number. Define Aρ := {zβ | β < ρ}
6. As you can
see, Aρ is the part of our chain we have managed to construct so far. We
need to distinguish two cases:
a) Aρ is upper bounded with respect to6M . Then it has to have “vertical”
upper bounds t0, t1... with spatial coordinates t
i
n = z
i
0 (i = 1, 2, 3). In this
case, we employ the above defined function T to choose one of the upper
bounds of Aρ:
tρ := T ({t ∈ R
4 | ∀β < ρ zβ 6M t ∧ t
i = zi0(i = 1, 2, 3)}). (11)
Then we put zρ := up(tρ, xρ), arriving at the next element of our chain L.
b) if Aρ is not upper bounded with respect to 6M , then no matter which
point in R4 we choose, it is possible to find a point from Aρ above it (since
Aρ is vertical). Therefore, the set
Bρ = {t ∈ Aρ | xρ 6M t} (12)
is not empty. We put [zρ] := T (Bρ), arriving at the next element of our chain
L.
Notice that in our chain it might happen that while α < β, zβ 6M zα, z0
is a lower bound of L. Therefore, our postulate 6 applies. By employing it
and corollary 7 we infer that⋂
σα∈Σh(y)
{Σh(zα)|zα ∈ L} 6= ∅. (13)
By our construction of the chain L, for all α it is true that xα 6M zα.
Therefore, Σh(zα) ⊆ Σh(xα). Thus, from 13 we immediately get⋂
σα∈Σh(y)
Σh(xα) 6= ∅, (14)
6Again, β is just an index, not a scenario, so Aρ is a subset of R
4.
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which is the equation 10 that we tried to show. Therefore, we arrive at a
contradiction and part 2 of the proof is complete.
Ad. 3. We have shown that there is a scenario σ ∈ Σ such that all
members of h can be identified as [xσ] for some x ∈ R
4. What remains is
to show that the history cannot “exclude” some regions of {σ} × R4, that
is, to prove that for all x ∈ R4, [xσ] ∈ h. But in lemma 4 we have shown
that {[xσ]|x ∈ R
4} is a maximal upward-directed subset of B, so any proper
subset of it cannot be maximal upward-directed. Q.E.D.
By showing lemmas 4 and 8 we have proved theorem 3.
3.2 The importance of the topological postulate
So far it might seem that our topological postulate 6 is just a handy trick for
proving lemma 8. To show its importance we will now prove that its falsity
leads to the falsity of the lemma, and then present an example of a structure
in which the lemma does not hold.
Theorem 9 If postulate 6 is false, then lemma 8 is also false.
Proof: Assume that our topological postulate does not hold. Therefore,
there exists a maximal upward-directed set h ⊆ B and a lower bounded chain
L ⊂ R4 such that the chain topology is not compact. By rules of topology
this is equivalent to the fact that there is a centred family of closed sets
with an empty intersection. But all closed sets in the chain topology form a
chain with respect to inclusion. Of course, if a part of a chain has an empty
intersection, a superset of the part also has an empty intersection. We infer
that ⋂
x∈L
Σh(x) = ∅, (15)
from which, by definition 5, we get that
¬∃σ ∈ Σ : ∀x ∈ L [xσ] ∈ h, (16)
so there is no scenario σ such that h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R
4}. Thus, lemma 8 is
false. Q.E.D.
In the next subsection we show a situation in which lemma 8 does not
hold. The construction resembles theM1 structure of Mu¨ller, Belnap, and Kishida
(2006).
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3.3 When the topological postulate is false
We will now show a situation in which lemma 8 does not hold. By fixing
two spatial dimensions we will restrict ourselves to R2, the first coordinate
representing time.
As usual, Σ is the set of all scenarios of a world B. Let C be the set of
all splitting points:
C :=
⋃
σ,η∈Σ
Cση
We put
C := {〈0, n〉|n ∈ N ∪ {0}} (17)
The idea is that all splitting points are binary: any scenario passing through
a given splitting point can go either “left” or “right”. Since there are as
many splitting points as natural numbers, we can identify Σ with a set of
01-sequences. Another requirement on Σ is that it contain only sequences
with finitely many 0s. Let G be a subset of Σ containing only the sequence
without any 0s and all sequences that have all their 0s at the beginning. The
elements of G will be labeled as below:
σ0 = 1111.....
σ1 = 01111....
σ2 = 00111....
σ3 = 00011....
Let us next consider a sequence ZMi of points in R
2 such that for all i ∈
N zi = 〈i − 1/2, 0〉. This way, a given zi ∈ Z
M
i is in the Minkowskian sense
above all splitting points 〈0, n〉|n < i and above no other splitting points.
Consider now a sequence Zi in B, Zi = {[ziσi]|i ∈ N}. We will now show
that Zi is a chain. Take any [zmσm], [znσn] ∈ Zi such that m 6= n. Either
m < n or n < m; suppose m < n (the other case is analogous). Since m < n,
zm 6M zn. zm ∈ Rσmσn since it is not above any splitting points between
σm and σn. Therefore zmσm ≡S zmσn, so [zmσm] 6S [znσn]. We have shown
that any two elements of Zi are comparable by 6S. Therefore, Zi is a chain
in B, thus being an upward-directed subset of B.
The set of all upward-directed subsets of B meets the requirements of the
Zorn-Kuratowski Lemma, since a set-theoretical sum of any chain subset of
it is also an upward-directed subset of B and is an upper bound of the chain
with respect to inclusion. Therefore, there exists a maximal upward-directed
subset of B (a history h∗) such that Zi ⊆ h
∗. But lemma 8 is false with
respect to this history, since for all σ ∈ Σ, h∗ 6= {[xσ]|x ∈ R
2}! Suppose
11
to the contrary, that for a certain σ ∈ Σ h = {[xσ]|x ∈ R
2}. As a member
of Σ, σ has to contain a “1” at some point k (starting with 0). Then both
[zk+1σk+1] ∈ h
∗ and [zk+1σ] ∈ h
∗, so zk+1 ∈ Rσkσk+1 . But Cσkσk+1 ∋ 〈0, k〉 6M
zk+1, so zk+1 /∈ Rσkσk+1 and thus we arrive at a contradiction.
We will now show that our topological postulate 6 is not met in this
situation. Consider a chain Z := ZMi ∪ {〈−1, 0〉}. Note that 〈−1, 0〉 =
inf(Z). Consider next the chain topology on Σh∗(〈−1, 0〉) (as defined in the
last section) with Z as the original chain. {Σh∗(zi)} is a centred family of
closed sets, but its intersection is empty, as Σ does not contain a scenario
corresponding to the sequence comprised of 0s only. Therefore, we arrived
at a contradiction with our corollary 7, so postulate 6 is not met: the chain
topology is not compact.
4 Conclusions
Having proved theorem 3, we can adopt Mu¨ller’s (2002) proof of the fact
that 〈B,6S〉 meets all the requirements in definition 2 and conclude that
it is a model of BST. We keep in mind, though, that we have introduced a
new postulate 6 into the proof and shown that it is not trivial (not always
true). We will demand that Minkowskian Branching Structures meet our
topological postulate. This way, a MBS is a special kind of BST model: its
Our World and ordering 6 are constructed as, respectively, B and 6S, as
proposed by Mu¨ller, and furthermore, our postulate 6 is true in the model.
Due to the following self-evident Fact, we have fulfilled our promise from
the introduction and produced BST models in which histories are isomorphic
to Minkowski space-times.
Fact 10 Let W = 〈W,6S〉 be an MBS and let h be a history in W of the
form {[xσ] | x ∈ R
4} for a certain σ ∈ Σ. Then
〈h,6S|h〉 ∼= 〈R
4,6M 〉
by means of the isomorphism i : h→ R4 such that i([xσ]) = x.
Let us observe that in contrast to general BST models, MBS models in-
volve numbers representing spatiotemporal locations, which raises the ques-
tion of whether the models are frame independent. The best way to read an
MBS model W is to consider it as produced by an idealized omniscient ob-
server associated with a given frame of reference F . Of every possible event,
the observer knows the event’s location (in his/her frame of reference), whe-
ther or not the event is a choice point, and what possible continuations the
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event has. There might be another MBS model W ′ of the same world but
produced by another idealized omniscient observer associated with a frame
of reference F ′. Since by the assumption, W and W ′ represent the same
world, there is a one-to-one correspondence I between point events of the
two models, with I([xα], [x
′
α′ ]) read as ‘the same event described in two dif-
ferent frames of reference’. We then say that W and W ′ are relativistically
invariant if for every [xα] ∈ W and [x
′
α′ ] ∈ W
′ such that I([xα], [x
′
α′ ]), x
′ is
the Lorentz transform of x. Thus, a distinction is looming between a single
MBS model which is frame-dependent, as it represents the world as seen from
some frame of reference, and the relativistically invariant set of MBS models
representing the world as seen from all (inertial) frames of reference.
Finally, can we generalize the construction so as to have branching struc-
tures produced out of space-times of general relativity? Unfortunately, the
answer is no. As already observed in Belnap (1992), in general space-times of
general relativity are not upward directed. That is, it is not (generally) true
that for incomparable x, y from a given space-time, there is a z such that
x 6 z and y 6 z. Yet recall that in BST histories must be upward-directed.
Thus, the task of producing generally-relativistic branching structures re-
quires a major overhaul of the BST theory.
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5 Appendix: splitting points and choice points
Since it purports to establish that “For histories hσ, hη ⊂ B the set Cσ,η
is the set of choice points”, Lemma 4 in Mu¨ller (2002) seems to require
reformulation. A splitting point, as a member of R4, is not a member of B,
and thus is not a choice point.
An obvious move would be to observe that every splitting point x for
scenarios σ and η in a sense “generates” a choice point for histories hσ and
hη. That is, if x ∈ Cση then [xσ] is maximal in hσ ∩ hη.
What might not be as evident is that, since we have dropped the requi-
rement of finitude of every Cση, the converse is not true: in some cases there
are choice points which are not “generated” in the above way by any splitting
points. We will now try to persuade the reader that this is indeed the case.
The idea is to use sequences of generated splitting points convergent to the
same point. The argument is simple in R2, as we need only two sequences,
but it gets more complicated as the number of dimensions increases. (For
convenience, in the argument below we use the symbols “>S” and “>M”
defined in the natural way and based on “6S” and “6M”, respectively.)
Definition 11 1. SCση := {[cσ]|c ∈ Cση}
2.Cση := {[xγ ] : (1) [xγ ] ∈ hσ ∩ hη and
(2) ∀z ∈ R4∀α ∈ Σ([zα] >S [xγ ]⇒ [zα] /∈ hσ ∩ hη)
“SCση” is to be read as “The set of generated choice points for histories
hσ and hη”.
“Cση” is to be read as “The set of choice points for histories hσ and hη”.
It is of course irrelevant whether we choose σ or η in square brackets in
the definition of the set of generated choice points, since if c ∈ Cση then
cσ ≡s cη and thus [cσ] = [cη].
Theorem 12 For some Cση, SCση  Cση.
Proof sketch. Again, by fixing two spatial dimensions we will restrict
ourselves to R2. Let x = (0, 0). Let C1 = {(0, 1/n)|n ∈ N\{0}} and C2 =
{(0,−1/n)|n ∈ N\{0}}. Let Cση = C1 ∪ C2. As x /∈ Cση, it is evident that
[xσ] /∈ SCση. We will show that [xσ] ∈ Cση, thus proving the theorem.
We have to show that [xσ] meets conditions (1) and (2) from the above
definition. As for (1), ∀c ∈ Cση x SLR c , so x ∈ Rση. It follows that
xσ ≡S xη and finally (as it is obvious that [xσ] ∈ hσ) that [xσ] ∈ hσ ∩ hη.
Now for (2). Consider [zα] such that (a) [zα] >S [xσ]. By definition of
>S, z >M x and xα = xσ. Let z = (z0, z1) (the first coordinate is temporal).
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We distinguish two cases: either the spatial coordinate z1 is equal to 0 or it
is something else.
If z = (z0, 0), take k ∈ R, k < z0 such that (0, k) ∈ Cση (such a k exists
since C1 converges to (0, 0)). (*) Since D
2
M(z, (0, k)) = k − z1 < 0, it follows
that x >M (0, k) ∈ Cση.
On the other hand, if z1 6= 0, consider v defined as follows:
v :=


1 if z1 ≥ 1
z1 if z1 ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (−1, 0)
−1 if z1 6 −1
We choose (0, k) ∈ Cση such that 0 < k 6 v (if v is positive) or v 6 k < 0
(if v is negative). It is always possible to find such a point, since both C1
and C2 converge to (0, 0). We have to prove that (b) z >M (0, k).
From (a) we know that (c) z >M (0, 0). To arrive at (b) it suffices to show
that (d) z >M (0, v). From (c) it follows that (e) z0 ≥ z1. We have two cases
to consider. First, if (f) z1 ≥ 1 or z1 6 −1, D
2
M(z, (0, v)) = −z
2
0 +(z1−1)
2 =
−z20 + z
2
1 +1−2z1, which (by (f) and (e)) is below 0, which fact is equivalent
to (d). Second, if z1 ∈ (0, 1)∪(−1, 0), D
2
M(z, (0, v)) = −z
2
0+(z1−z1)
2 = −z20
which is of course negative, so again we arrive at (d).
From (c) and (d) and from the requirement on choosing (0, k) we get the
needed result (b).
Since z >M (0, k) ∈ Cση, it is true that z /∈ Rση and thus [zα] /∈ hσ ∩ hη.
We have thus proved that [xσ] fulfills condition (2).
Unfortunately already in R3 the construction fails at point (*). To over-
come the problem we would have to use four sequences of splitting points
convergent to (0, 0, 0) (intuitively situated at the arms of the coordinate sys-
tem). To deal with the situation in R4 we would have to similarly introduce
six sequences convergent to (0, 0, 0, 0). We will not dwell on the details here,
as the point being made does not seem to be significant enough in proportion
to the arduous complexity of the argument.
Conjecture 13 For any scenarios σ, η ∈ Σ, the set Cση contains exclusively
points which belong to SCση or points [xα] such that x is a limit of a sequence
of points belonging to Cση.
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